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Summary 
Ambiguity and controversy abounds the debate over the thousands of people 
trying to enter the European territory and their rights, especially in their 
procedural form. This paper explores the latest developments in the context 
of the European Court of Human Rights’ and the European Court of 
Justice’s expansive interpretation of the right to an effective remedy and the 
procedural guarantees afforded to protection seekers by the pertaining 
international and regional legislation. In their recent judgments the Courts 
have determined both the states’ obligations on guaranteeing fair and 
effective procedures for people trying to enter Europe as well as the 
individuals' corresponding right to seek protection. The paper takes a 
thorough look at the reasoning of the Courts and emphasizes on the -not any 
more underlying but- explicit dynamic of the right to an effective remedy in 
acquiring a separate identity in refugee regime, guaranteeing the right to 
seek international protection by means of procedure. The majority of the 
cases discussed holds that a State’s failure to offer fair and effective 
procedures guaranteeing those people’s substantive rights such as the right 
not to be exposed to the risk of persecution and torture can itself be a 
violation of the right to an effective remedy. The conclusions drawn through 
a constructive synthesis of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the main CEAS instruments such as Dublin II, the Asylum Procedures and 
Qualification Directives are significant for two reasons. First, they signal 
new perceptions in the area of international protection highlighting 
particularly the potential of coherence in the asylum process, by weighing 
up and balancing partly incompatible demands. Second, they assert the 
implications of the Courts’ judgments on Member States and their intra-EU 
relations as well as on protection seekers themselves by emphasizing on the 
adherence to a procedure which  the application of the rights and principles 
premising the contemporary refugee regime is contingent upon. 
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Preface 
There are so many things, I learned during the process of writing this thesis. 
Probably most important to me was the discovery of the potential impact of 
a constructive synthesis of EU and international law on national asylum 
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content of the research, but also to the coherence and readability of the text. 
Their invaluable insights, critical view and encouragement determine to a 
significant degree the character of the present study and made thesis writing 
a fruitful experience. 
I am also indebted to my colleagues from the International Human Rights 
Law Master Programme at Lund University, Racheal Busingye and Messai 
Ali for all those inspired discussions we had during the past two years 
mirrored in the present work. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Contextual background 
It is beyond any doubt that Europe is deemed as a sanctuary by a rapidly 
growing number of people fleeing from what seem to be, and often are, 
intolerable conditions in their countries of origin. The bitter truth is that the 
current refugee regime falls short of affording adequate protection to those 
in need. The endemic burdens and responsibilities of refugee protection 
have increasingly made states willing to avoid the particularized obligations 
that arise when refugees arrive at their territory. Unconvinced that refugees 
will ever return home, governments adopt policies that envisage the 
deterrence of refugees by non-entre and other containment practices, or 
drive refugees away by offering only an inhumane variety of "protection".1 
The fundamental criticism of the European Union (EU) approach towards 
refugees is that it has combined asylum with immigration.2 More 
specifically the idea of granting protection to those in need has been 
dangerously blurred with the process of combating illegal migration, a 
phenomenon best reflected in the area of European border control 
management. Practices such as turning back, transferring to European front-
line states or to non-European coastal states which fail to comply with 
international human rights standards, as well as offshore processing of 
asylum determination procedures, have been highly criticized for 
1 Hathaway, J. & Neve, A., 1997, Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A 
Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 Harv. Hum. Rts. J., 209. 
2Art. 63 European Union’s own Annual Report on Human Rights for 2003 lumps asylum 
and immigration together. 
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prioritizing security at the expense of protection. However, history has 
shown that the refugee context is changing, the key change being the 
apparently permanent refugee crisis, from which no European state is 
wholly immune.3 This is a reality which the Courts seem to take seriously 
into account, pointing to the increased need of addressing the problem with 
the necessary cautiousness, rejecting securitization policies and emphasizing 
on solutions aiming at the improvement of the overall level and quality of 
protection.  It was exactly due to states’ failure to provide people trying to 
enter Europe with the procedural guarantees flowing from its substantive 
rights under international and EU law that left space for the Courts to 
undertake action and confirm their role as guarantors of the compliance with 
the legal rules and principles they are adopted to promote. Struggling to 
pragmatically correspond to current demands the Courts see no reason why 
consideration of the right to seek protection under international and 
community standards should be restricted to substantive law. Rather, the 
basic principles of asylum protection seem to rank among the legal norms 
that the Courts take seriously into consideration for regulating international 
protection issues in the context of internal and external activities of the 
Member States.  
  
1.2 Theory and methodology 
As opposed to the old discourse which amalgamates the internal security 
with the enjoyment of refugee protection by third-county nationals the 
3 Schuck, P., 1997, Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal, 22 Yale J. Int'l L. 289. 
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hypothesis running throughout the present paper is that we are witnessing a 
new dynamic in the way that refugee protection is being interpreted in the 
Courts’ attempt to bridge the gap between the legitimate concerns of states 
and the realization of an adequate refugee protection framework. Putting it 
into the sphere of theory, the latest jurisprudential trends seem to indicate a 
tendency to balance two partly conflicting EU policy frames, realism and 
liberalism. To be sure, although it is undeniable that the majority of 
European states is built upon the ideas of democracy and human rights, one 
cannot dismiss the fact that states’ own interests determine certain 
boundaries in the pursuit of democratic values.  
So, on the one side of the spectrum there is the norm of state sovereignty 
which requires a tight and controlled entry of third country nationals into the 
European territory for the sake of internal security and stability (realism) 
and on the other side lies the humanitarian imperative with the individual in 
central concern, underlining the norms of human rights with focus on the 
right of individuals to receive protection and to have access to equitable 
asylum procedures (liberalism).4 Although the Amsterdam Treaty5 calls for 
a common European asylum and immigration policy in an ‘area of freedom, 
security and justice’ (Title IV EC) and asserts the common commitment to 
liberal standards of international law (Art. 6 and Art. 7 EU), the measures 
adopted at the EU level are mainly instruments which pursue primarily 
political realism orientations, prioritizing the aim of securing borders 
4 Lavenex, S., 2001, The Europeanisation of Refugee Policies. Between Human Rights and 
Internal Security, Aldershot/Burlington, Ashgate. 
5 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing 
the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 1997 O.J. C 340/1 [Treaty of 
Amsterdam]. 
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against (irregular) immigration and (bogus) refugees, thus relegating the 
promotion of humanitarian standards, freedom of movement and the rule of 
law to the background. What follows is that despite being clear in substance, 
the rules governing democratic standards in the EU are difficult to enforce 
in practice. Under these circumstances and taking the realist nature of the 
EU acquis6 into account, the recent developments in the European case law 
indicate and prioritize the need for certain procedural standards of human 
rights protection to guaranteeing the liberal freedoms and fundamental 
human rights for the individuals in question. 
With this as the theoretical background, the present study analyzes the right 
to effective remedies and procedural guarantees for protection seekers 
through the recent jurisprudence of the European Courts. It uses the method 
of intertextual chains in order to address common features found in different 
judgments as well as the contextual analysis in order to understand what 
kind of ideology emerge in the area of procedure in migration and asylum 
cases and what are the implications stemming from this type of ideology. In 
particular, the contextual analysis, namely the whole environment which the 
judgments discussed come from and aim at, sheds light to the motives, 
grounds and implications of the Courts reasoning when interpreting the 
letter and spirit of existing legislation and international protection practices 
followed by states.  
 
6 The term EU acquis applies to the totality of measures adopted in the fields of 
immigration and asylum policy. For a comprehensive account, see Guild, El., Niessen, J., 
1996, The Developing Immigration and Asylum Policies of the European Union, The 
Hague: Kluwer. 
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1.3 Research goal and questions 
The examination of the latest case law aims to denoting the promising 
character of the Courts’ synthetic and pragmatic interpretation of the rules 
and principles, either included in national or European instruments or 
international treaties. Such approach, arguably, comes to strengthen the 
discussion in favor of the pivotal role of the right to an effective remedy as 
part of a fair determination procedure offering the individuals involved the 
right to claim their substantive rights, as well as in favor of coherence in the 
asylum system.  
The present thesis is basically premised on the idea that refugee protection 
cannot be regarded as substantial, without guaranteeing effective procedural 
safeguards and remedial mechanisms. In that context, the judgments 
discussed share a common feature: they create an additional claim for 
applicants to the related Courts that represents the interests of individuals 
allegedly deprived by Member States' agents from a procedure enabling 
them to exercise their right to seek protection. In light of these, the paper 
aspires to analyze the content of refugee protection in its procedural 
dimension under the recent case law related to the right to an effective 
remedy and draw the necessary conclusions as to whether the Courts’ 
interpretation may signal new perceptions in the area of international 
protection. A schematic depiction of the process of defining the research 
topic would be as follows: 
 9 
  
As far as the research methodology and material is concerned the study was 
basically conducted through a review of the last two and a half years’ (2011 -
2012 - May 2013) case law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
(hereinafter ECtHR or “European Court”) and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, (hereinafter CJEU or “Court of Justice”) with focus on the 
right to an effective remedy in relation to protection seekers. The research 
included a review of available literature, the examination of a selection of the 
pertaining international and regional instruments, as well as related 
commentaries and human right organizations reports.  It is noteworthy that, 
amongst the plethora of authors who have touched upon the issues discussed in 
that paper, I chose to look into the articles focusing on the impact of 
Community Law into the asylum regime and discuss reflections on relevant 
judgments.  
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1.4 Scope and delimitations 
Admittedly, the ECtHR judgments are strongly case-related.7 Equally, the 
CJEU judges on an ad hoc and in concreto basis. Nevertheless, the 
argumentation included in their most recent case law addresses practical 
factual circumstances instead of general and abstract questions which, 
arguably, contribute to cleaning the cloudy picture of the procedural aspect 
of EU Member State’s obligations towards protection seekers. Having that 
in mind, I specifically chose to deal with the ECtHR and the CJEU as they 
have gradually established themselves as the two key refugee law judicial 
mechanisms in Europe and not to expand -due to the limited space- to cases 
of other human right mechanisms such as UN Committees.  
1.5 Outline 
As already mentioned, this paper looks into the recent Courts’ case law, 
underlines the innovations related to procedural safeguards in the 
international protection field and draws some conclusions of more extensive 
character and application. Particularly, Chapter 2 provides background on 
the right to an effective remedy, emphasizing on its role of substantiating 
and linking together scattered provisions of refugee protection of 
international and regional character. Chapter 3 tracks the development of 
the procedural aspect doctrine through the Courts’ case law. It looks 
thoroughly into the way that Courts are interpreting the content and function 
of the right to an effective remedy, underlines the innovations and makes 
7Fischer-Lescano, A., Löhr, T. & Tohidipur, T., 2009, Border Controls at Sea: 
Requirements under International Human Rights and Refugee Law, Int. J Refugee Law 
21(2): 272. 
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comparisons in terms of the scope of the provision between the rights 
provided in the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) 8 and EU 
Law. Chapter 4 attempts a synthesis of findings based on earlier analysis 
and examines the implications of the Courts’ expansive interpretation and 
its impact on intra-EU relations (Dublin returns) and external border 
management (interception on the high seas). It further reckons with the 
complications of the Courts’ interpretation and finally, discusses alternatives 
in an effort to expand Courts’ findings and suggest some follow up actions 
driven by the EU panoply that seem to have the dynamic of strengthening 
Europe’s approach to international protection issues. 
1.6 Definitions 
A word about terminology: The term “asylum” in this paper takes an elastic 
understanding referring to the institution in its broader sense rather than 
being limited exclusively to refugee status. It thus, encompasses not only the 
protection afforded to individuals qualifying as refugees under Article 1A of 
the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter 1951 or 
Refugee Convention)9 but also the subsidiary protection, temporary 
protection, protection for humanitarian reasons or statelessness. That being 
said the terms “refugee” and “protection seeker” as used in this paper 
include everyone who tries to enter Europe in search of protection in a 
broader sense that is why the terms “asylum” and “international protection” 
are being used interchangeably throughout the present study. Further, the 
8 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 
November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) ETS 005 
9 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 Jul. 1951, entered into force 22 
Apr. 1954), 189 UNTS 137. 
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term “country of origin” is used here to mean the country in which the 
applicant originally feared of being persecuted. The phrase “destination 
country” refers to the country in which the applicant hopes to settle and is 
now applying for asylum, while the term “third country” refers to the 
particular third country to which the destination country is contemplating 
return, encompassing interchangeably both the first country of asylum as 
well as mere safe third country.   
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2 International and EU Asylum 
Law: A “give and take” 
relationship 
This chapter indicates how the relevant regional and international asylum 
provisions within the Courts’ jurisprudence are tightly interconnected 
focusing on the protection afforded to people in need under the Common 
European Asylum regime and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union. It mainly aims at presenting the specific framework served 
as the basis for the Courts’ ratio decidendi. Section 2.1 concentrates on the 
nexus between the non-refoulement principle and the right to an effective 
remedy while section 2.2 discusses the link between EU legislation and the 
ECHR provisions.  
2.1 The Right to an effective remedy in 
International Law: The nexus to non 
refoulement principle  
It is crucial before the analysis of the Courts’ submissions on the matters 
discussed in this paper, to consider the bigger picture, which will definitely 
be invoked many times throughout the whole research. This picture cannot 
but include the link between the right to an effective remedy which is the 
one pole and the essence of refugee protection, being the other. To that end 
the contact element of the non-refoulement principle has to be discussed. 
International law and specifically the 1951 Convention provides for refugee 
status. There is no right to asylum in international law. Art. 14 of the 
 14 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR10) provides, only a right to 
seek and to enjoy asylum, not a right to asylum. Furthermore, the UDHR is 
only a General Assembly Resolution and is not automatically legally 
binding. To be sure, some parts of the UDHR reflect customary 
international law or have been subsumed within rights in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, but Art. 14 was not included in either 
Covenant and state practice is not sufficiently consistent to suggest that Art. 
14 has achieved customary status. The best that can be said is that aspects of 
Art. 14 are necessary for the proper implementation of non-refoulement. On 
the other hand, the draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe11 
provides for a right to asylum in Art. II-18 but continues that it shall be 
‘guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 
July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of 
refugees and in accordance with the Constitution’ – there is no right to 
asylum in the 1951 Convention. The right that pursuant to the 1951 
Convention refugees do possess is non-refoulement under Article 33, 
namely the right not to be sent back to a state where the refugee’s life or 
liberty would be threatened. However, it has been established that 
individuals qualifying as refugees under the 1951 Convention acquire more 
than the right of non-refoulement which undoubtedly stands out as the 
10 United Nations General Assembly resolution 217 A (III), Paris 10 December 1948.   
11Adopted by consensus by the European Convention on 13 June and 10 July 2003 
Submitted to the President of the European Council in Rome, 18 July 2003 (2003/C 
169/01). 
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centerpiece. Apart from that, they acquire a bundle of associated rights to 
fair and humane treatment rooted in both domestic and international law.12  
Following the same line of thought, in his conquering opinion in Hirsi 
Jamaa and Others v Italy (Hirsi) case13 Judge Pinto De Albuquerque argues 
that the non-refoulement obligation has two procedural consequences: the 
duty to advise an alien of his or her rights to obtain international protection 
and the duty to provide for an individual, fair and effective refugee status 
determination and assessment procedure. Discharging the non-refoulement 
obligation, he continues, requires an evaluation of the personal risk of harm, 
which can only take place if aliens have access to a fair and effective 
procedure by which their cases are considered individually. These 
procedural guarantees apply to all asylum seekers regardless of their legal 
and factual status, as has been recognized in international refugee law,14 
universal human rights law15 and regional human rights law.16 Besides, if 
12 One of the few provisions of the 1951 Convention which delineates a specific right in 
nonrelative terms is Art. 16.1 access to court. See Legomsky, S., 2003, Secondary Refugee 
Movements and the Return of Asylum Seekers to Third Countries: The Meaning of 
Effective Protection, 15 Int'l J. Refugee L. 612. 
13 ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy, no 27765/09, 23 February 2012. 
14 Executive Committee of UNHCR Conclusion No. 82 (1997), par. d(iii) and Executive 
Committee Conclusion No. 85 (1998), par. q); UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and 
Criteria of Determining Refugee Status, HCR/IP/4/Eng/Rev.1, 1992, par. 189-223 and 
International Law Association, Resolution 6/2002 on Refugee Procedures (Declaration on 
International Minimum Standards for Refugee Protection) 2002, par. 1, 5 and 8. 
15 See the judgment of the International Court of Justice of 30 November 2010 in the 
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo case, A/CN.4/625, par. 82, in the light of Article 13 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 12 (4) of the African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights; UN Committee Against Torture, SH v. Norway, 
Communication No. 121/1998, 19 April 2000, CAT/C/23/D/121/1998 (2000), par. 7.4, and 
Falcon Rios v. Canada, Communication No. 133/1999, 17 December 2004, 
CAT/C/33/D/133/1999, par. 7.3, Conclusions and Recommendations: France, 
CAT/C/FRA/CO/3, 3 April 2006, par. 6, Conclusions and Recommendations: Canada, 
CAT/C/CR/34/CAN, 7 July 2005, par. 4 (c) and (d), Consideration of Reports Submitted by 
states Parties under article 19 of the Convention, China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 21 November 
2008, par. 18 (D); UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 15: The position 
of Aliens under the Covenant, 1986, par. 10; UN Committee on the elimination of racial 
discrimination, General rec. 30, Discrimination against Non-Citizens, 
CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3, 2004, par. 26; UN Special Rapporteur on the prevention of 
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refugee status is accepted to be declaratory rather than constitutive, as is 
generally acknowledged,17 then preventing a refugee from accessing the 
status determination procedures within a state can be the equivalent of 
refoulement; that being said, Article 14 of the UDHR, as such with its right 
to seek asylum, is a necessary adjunct to non-refoulement. This argument is 
in line with the paper’s main submission that refugee protection cannot be 
regarded as substantial, without guaranteeing the right to seek protection as 
such through effective procedural safeguards and remedial mechanisms, 
given that they are so intertwined so as to be regarded as two sides of the 
same coin. In that context, the right to an effective remedy constitutes a 
significant component of the procedure provided to a protection seeker as a 
consequence of his or her fundamental right not to be refoule. 
Additionally, non-refoulement is custom and protects anyone whose life or 
freedom would be threatened, not just Article 1A(2) refugees who are the 
beneficiaries of Article 33.18 Customary non-refoulement draws on the 
prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
provided in Article 3 of the UN’s Convention against Torture and Article 3 
of the ECHR. Returning anyone to where they would face torture, inhuman 
discrimination, final report of Mr. David Weissbrodt, E/CN4/Sub2/, 2003, 23, par. 11; and 
UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants Mr Jorge Bustamante, Annual 
report, Doc. A/HRC/7/12, 25 February 2008, par. 64. 
16 Inter-American Commission, Haitian Centre for Human Rights et al. v. US, case 10.675, 
par. 163, in view of Article XXVII of the American Declaration of Human Rights, and the 
judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 28 July 2011, in the Brahim 
Samba Diouf case (C-69-10), in the light of Article 39 of the Directive 2005/85/CE. 
17 These principles are well settled. See e.g. UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria 
for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating 
to the Status of Refugees HCH/IP/Eng/REV.1 (1979, reedited 1992), par. 28; UNHCR, 
Note on the Treatment of Persons who seek Asylum at a Country’s Port of Entry (Nov. 
1991) reproduced in UNHCR Refworld – Legal Information (1998), par. 3.1. 
18 See Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, ‘The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non 
refoulement: Opinion’ in E. Feller, V. Türk and F. Nicholson (eds.), Refugee Protection in 
International Law, 87. 
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or degrading treatment or punishment from within Europe would breach the 
State’s international human rights law obligations. That is why international 
law requires an individualized, case-by-case determination of whether to 
return the applicant to a third country.  
It is noteworthy here that the Tampere European Council Meeting of 
October 1999 added some important parameters for any analysis of the 
European approach to international refugee law. The Presidency 
Conclusions provide that the European Council ‘reaffirms the importance 
the Union and Member States attach to absolute respect of the right to seek 
asylum and that the establishment of the Common Asylum Policy would be 
‘based on the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention, thus 
ensuring that nobody is sent back to persecution, i.e. maintaining the 
principle of non-refoulement’.19 In light of that affirmation, it is being 
established in the Courts’ case law that in order to meet its obligations under 
the 1951 Convention, a destination country may not return an asylum seeker 
to a third country until the entire determination process, including appeal, 
has been completed. Only in that case, there can be adequate assurance that 
the person’s Convention rights, including the right of non-refoulement, will 
be observed. Such an approach was adopted in most of the cases discussed 
below, including those dealing exclusively with deportation issues and not 
specifically with refugee cases. Thus, I reserve the relevant comments for 
Chapter 3 where the actual analysis of the issues touched upon here, takes 
place.  
19 Tampere European Council, 15 and 16 October 1999, Presidency Conclusions, 
16/10/1999 -  Nr: 200/1/99. 
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However and before the analysis, another contact element that will 
contribute to a large extent to our understanding of the bigger picture here, 
is the interaction of the ECHR and EU acquis provisions related to refugee 
rights and the right to an effective remedy. 
2.2 ECHR and its link with EU’s internal 
legal order 
As stated earlier, the novel part of the present thesis is the determination of 
the procedural aspect of the EU Member State’s obligations vis-à-vis people 
seeking protection through a constructive synthesis of the relevant 
legislation, be it regional and international. In light of this combined with 
the fact that we are putting two different Courts -the ECtHR and the CJEU- 
under the microscope, the need to examine both legislative backgrounds that 
serve as their platform seems absolutely necessary. 
To begin with, the Treaty on European Union (TEU),20 adopted in 1992, is a 
significant step towards the integration of human rights concerns in EU law, 
policy and regulation. It converts these concerns for human rights into 
obligations of the Union to "respect freedoms, fundamental human rights, in 
accordance with the protections afforded by the ECHR, as those that arise 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States as general 
principles of Community law”.21 By amending much of the Maastricht TEU 
as well as the other previous treaties, the Amsterdam Treaty formally 
incorporates fundamental human rights into the institutions of the EU. 
Additionally, the jurisdiction of the CJEU has been expanded to include 
20 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29, 1992, O.J. C 191/1 [Maastricht 
TEU]. 
21 Article 6.3. 
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matters relating to immigration, asylum, visas, border crossings, and judicial 
criminal cooperation, and at one level the EU has established the first 
international refugee tribunal, which is now required to apply human rights 
standards as set out in the ECHR to the acts of Community institutions.22 
Where international law is discussed it is largely confined to the ECHR and 
the extent to which its provisions form part of the EU’s internal legal order 
(via ‘general principles of law’ and Article 6 TEU) and the legal weight of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘Charter’)23 
rather than by virtue of any obligations which might be incumbent on the 
EU directly under international law.24 Scholars tend to concentrate more on 
this because the EU has progressively brought human rights into its internal 
regime, giving them a higher profile within the treaties (Arts 6 and 7 TEU) 
and with the Charter. 
It is important to note here that proclaimed in 2000, the Charter has become 
legally binding on the EU with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
in December 2009. According to Guild, the Charter is “neither a national 
constitution nor an international human rights treaty. Instead it belongs to 
the EU legal order and depends for its interpretation and enforcement on 
the mechanisms of EU law”. In this regard, he continues, “it imposes 
obligations on state authorities that are not amenable to modification. Its 
definitive interpretation is the preserve of the CJEU and when provided is 
binding on both national administrations across the Member States and 
22 Art. 6.2. 
23 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000/C 364/01. 
24 Alston and Weiler, 1998, An Ever Closer Union in Need of a Human Rights Policy, 9 
EJIL, 658; Engel, 2001, The European Charter of Fundamental Rights, A Changed Political 
Opportunity Structure and its Normative Consequences, 7 ELJ, 151. 
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national courts”.25 In that context, it is evident that the rights included in 
the Charter are to a certain extent a useful complement of the rights 
embedded in the ECHR.26 
With regards in particular to the principle of effective judicial protection, 
it’s settled case-law in the CJEU that it constitutes a general principle of EU 
law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States, enshrined in Article 6 of the ECHR.27 As specifically argued in 
Samba Diouf case, there is a direct link between the right to an effective 
remedy under Article 47 of the Charter and Article 13 of the ECHR, 
although the protection afforded in the Charter is more extensive.28 That 
being said the content of the right to judicial protection recognized by 
Article 47 must be defined by reference to the meaning and scope conferred 
on that right by the ECHR (Article 52(3) of the Charter), but, once defined, 
its scope must be that described in the words of the Charter itself, the scope 
enjoyed by the ‘rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union’.29 
What seems to be the basis of the above Court’s reasoning is the model of 
coherence,30 namely the conception that a legal justification which is 
supported by a fairly coherent system contributes to practical rationality and 
25 E. Guild, 2010, The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon: Fundamental Rights and 
EU Citizenship, CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe Series, CEPS, Brussels, p. 6. 
26 Brouwer, E., 2005, Effective Remedies for Third Country Nationals in EU Law: Justice 
Accessible to All? European Journal of Migration and Law 7: 221. 
27 See, for example, Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651, par. 18 and 19; Case C-50/00 
P Unión de PequeñosAgricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677, par. 39; Case C-279/09 
DEB [2010] ECR I-0000, par. 29; Case C-69/10, Brahim Samba Diouf [2011] par. 35. 
28 CJEU, Case C-69/10, Brahim Samba Diouf v Ministre du Travail, de l’Emploi et de 
l’Immigration, Opinion of Advocate General CRUZ VILLALÓN delivered on 1 March 
2011 (2) par. 38; See also the Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(2007/C 303/02), OJ 303. 
29 Ibid, Opinion, par. 42. 
30 For the concept of coherence see, among others: Dworkin, Ronald. 1986. Law's Empire. 
London: Fontana.  
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finally to a more coherent decision. This point us to the main argument of 
the present thesis that the Courts’ reliance on cross-connections between 
regional and international legislation is of great value to immigration and 
refugee cases since, if nothing else, it supports elementary demands of 
justice31 taking primarily into account the main contextual and factual 
factors of each and every case.  In other words, the product of such a 
reasoning process is a decision legally justified by virtue of its coherence 
with established law (letter and spirit) and principles as well as with each 
case’s factual circumstances.32 
The influence of the activity of the Council of Europe and the jurisprudence 
of the Strasbourg Court on Article 13 of the ECHR can clearly be traced in 
the relevant provisions of the Charter. The special significance given to the 
ECHR is a positive step in the EU’s recognition of the relevance of human 
rights principles outside the Community system to developments within the 
Community system.33 However, it should be born in mind that the EU is not 
bound to comply with the letter of the ECHR or case law of the ECtHR, 
rather the acceptance of any right as part of the general principles of 
Community law is taken on a case-by-case basis.34 On the other hand the 
EU is pursuing harmonization on an impressive range of fronts,35 an 
31 MacCormick, Neil, 1984, Coherence in Legal Justification. In Theory of Legal Science. Ed. 
A. Peczenik et al., 243, Dordrecht: Reidel. 
32 See Amaya, A., 2011, Legal Justification by Optimal Coherence. Ratio Juris. Vol. 24 
No. 3, p.  317. 
33 Tawhida, A., and Israel de Jesús Butler, 2006, The European Union and Human Rights: 
An International Law Perspective, EJIL Vol. 17(4), 774. 
34 For example, Right to a judicial remedy—Case 222/84 Johnston v. Chief Constable of 
the RUC [1986] ECR 1651. 
35 For general accounts of the harmonization carried out in the field of asylum in Europe 
see Carol Harlow and Elspeth Guild (eds), Implementing Amsterdam: immigration and 
asylum rights in EC law, Oxford: Hart Publications 2001; Rosemary Byrne, Gregor Noll 
and Jens Vedsted-Hansen, New Asylum Countries? Migration Control and Refugee 
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objective mirrored in most of the discussed judgments the realization of 
which remains to be seen after the following analysis. The initiatives under 
the Common European Asylum System on which the Courts based their 
interpretation of the right to an effective remedy, discussed in detail below, 
include the Regulation EC 343/2003 on the responsibility for the application 
of asylum in the EU Member States (or the Dublin II Regulation)36 as well 
as the Council’s Qualification (QD)37 Asylum Procedures (APD)38 and 
Reception Conditions (RCD) 39 Directives.  
 
Protection in an Enlarged European Union, The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2002; 
and Gisbert Brinkmann, ‘The Immigration and Asylum Agenda’, 10 European Law 
Journal 2004, pp. 182–199. 
36 Council Regulation 343/2003/EC, OJ L 50, 25.02.2003. 
37 Council Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of 
third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for 
a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the 
content of the protection granted OJ L 337 replacing the Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 
29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country 
nationals or stateless persons as refugees or persons otherwise in need of international 
protection and the content of the protection OJ L 304. 
38 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on 
procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status OJ L 326. 
39  Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for 
the reception of asylum seekers in the Member States OJ L 31. 
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3 Analyzing the concept of 
effective protection 
After having looked through the focal points of international protection and 
the relevant legal background, it seems consistent to continue to the actual 
analysis of the Courts’ findings, in order to draw some conclusions on the 
right to remedial mechanisms and procedural safeguards which, in 
combination, compose the concept of effective protection. Looking at the 
latest trends in the jurisprudence developed by the European Court and the 
Court of Justice related to refugee protection, one notices the Courts’ focus 
on the right to an effective remedy as enshrined in Article 13 of the ECHR 
taken alone and in connection with Article 3 (prohibition against ill-
treatment), Article 4 Protocol 4 (prohibition of collective expulsions), 
Article 8 (protection of family life), as well as in connection with Article 47 
of the EU Charter (right to an effective remedy), Article 48 (right of 
defense), Article 41 (right to good administration) and Article 18 (right to 
asylum). Regard will also be made to Article 39 of the Procedures Directive 
(the right to an effective remedy) as well as to Articles 3 and 19 of the 
Dublin II Regulation. 
Although Article 6 (right to a fair and public hearing) which lies at the heart 
of effective judicial protection cannot be ignored, it is fair to note here that it 
is not directly relevant to the subject of this study since it has mainly been 
discussed by the Courts in cases of expulsion proceedings, related to the 
determination of the applicant’s civil rights and obligations or of criminal 
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and administrative offences.40 In particular it is examined when there seems 
to be a risk of “flagrant denial of justice” in the country of return,41 usually 
together with Article 1 Protocol 7 (procedural safeguards relating to the 
expulsion of aliens). In light of this, the present analysis will be limited on 
Article 13 which provides for a more general obligation on States than the 
obligation to be found in Article 6 or Article 1 of Protocol 7, successfully 
invoked by protection seekers and refugees.42  
Having the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (M.S.S.)43 novel judgment as the 
starting point, I am examining a series of judgments of both the Strasbourg 
and the Luxembourg Court, dealing with asylum and non-refoulement cases 
and focusing on the notion of effective protection in all its possible 
dimensions. By digging into the judgments in question I aspire to underline 
the evolving and rising tendency of the judiciary to intervene -so far as their 
share allows- and specify the procedural rules which serve as catalysts for 
the realization of the pertaining substantive rights of the applicants. Both 
Courts have a rich case law related to violations of the right to an effective 
remedy, however, it has been in the last three years that this right attained so 
much attention especially with regard to immigration and refugee law cases. 
Although mainly examined in conjunction with other rights which serve a 
supporting role to the legal reasoning of most judgments, the right to an 
40 Lambert, H., 2005, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Protection of 
Refugees: Limits and Opportunities, Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 24; 2 p. 44-45. See for 
example ECtHR, Maaouia v. France, no. 39652/98, 5 October 2000. 
41 See, among others, ECtHR, Soering v. UK, par.113; Drozd and Janousek v. France and 
Spain (1992), par. 110; Bolat v. Russia, no 14139/03, 5 October 2006, par. 83. 
42 ECtHR, Silver and Others v. UK, no. 7136/75,  25 March 1983, para.109. 
43 ECtHR, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, no. 30696/09, 21 January 2011. 
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effective remedy became in some cases the critical point of the Courts’ ratio 
decidendi.  
Before diving into the merits of each and every case, it is necessary to map 
the key issues discussed below, the synthesis of which will finally provide 
us with a codification of the States’ obligations towards protection seekers 
from a procedural standpoint, defining the practical meaning of effective 
protection. Those issues are related to: i) the principle of subsidiarity and 
procedural autonomy of states, ii) the content and scope of the right to an 
effective remedy which includes the discussion of presumptions, burden of 
proof and good administration, and finally iii) the case of interception on the 
high seas with procedural guarantees. 
3.1 The margin of states’ discretion in 
procedural issues 
There is no safer way to begin defining states’ duties than by first 
acknowledging their limits. As it has been stressed out repeatedly by the 
ECtHR the states enjoy a certain margin of appreciation when dealing with 
asylum and immigration cases, given that pertaining policies are considered 
a form of territorial sovereignty exercise. According to the Court’s case-law, 
Contracting States have the right, as a matter of well-established 
international law and subject to their treaty obligations, including the 
Convention, to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens.44 
Specifically as far as the right to an effective remedy is concerned, in the 
44 See, among many other authorities, ECtHR Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the 
United Kingdom, no 9214/80, 28 May 1985, par. 67, Series A no. 94, and Boujlifa v. 
France, no 25404/94, 21 October 1997, par. 42, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-
VI. 
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recent I.M. v. France (I.M.) judgment the Court reiterated that in asylum 
and immigration cases it confines itself, in accordance with the subsidiarity 
principle, to verifying that the domestic procedures are effective and that 
they safeguard human rights.45 This argument inspired the CJEU Advocate 
General in the H.I.D. case where he expressed the opinion that as regards 
the organization of procedures and the determination of the relevant time-
limits, it is the national procedural law that must be applied, in accordance 
with the principle of the procedural autonomy of Member States.46  Equally, 
in M.S.S. case the ECtHR seems to apply the principle of subsidiarity as it 
transpires from Article 1 of the ECHR according to which, it falls primarily 
to the states to guarantee and implement the rights enshrined in the 
Convention47. That is why it did not itself examine the actual asylum 
applications or verified how the states honor their obligations under the 
1951 Convention, rather its main concern was whether effective guarantees 
exist that protect the applicant against arbitrary refoulement, be it direct or 
indirect, to the country from which he or she has fled. In particular the Court 
attaches this subsidiary character of the machinery of complaint in Article 
13 -and 35 § 1- of the Convention.48 As stressed by Judge Villiger in his 
concurring opinion the function of the Convention and the Court remains to 
provide a European minimum standard. Relevant to that is the mantra of the 
Strasbourg Court that the right to asylum is not contained in either the 
45 ECtHR, I.M. v. France, no 9152/09, 2 February 2012, par. 136; See also M. and Others v. 
Bulgaria, no. 41416/08, 26 July 2011, par. 128. 
46 CJEU, Case C-175/11, H.I.D., B.A. v Refugee Applications Commissioner, Refugee 
Appeals Tribunal, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Ireland, Attorney 
General, Opinion of Advocate General BOT delivered on 6 September 2012, par. 63 
47 ECtHR, Handyside v. the United Kingdom, no 5493/72, 7 December 1976 par. 48, Series 
A no. 24; M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece,  no. 30696/09, (GC) 21 January 2011, Concurring 
Opinion of Judge Villiger. 
48 M.S.S. cited above, par. 286-287 
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Convention or its Protocols49 the responsibility of states is however engaged 
in cases of expulsion, extradition or any measure of removal that can give 
rise to Article 3 of the Convention.50 That is why the ECtHR maintains that 
the issue to be examined in refugee cases is whether or not the available 
domestic remedies meet the requirement of effectiveness under Article 13 
and the Court’s case-law.51 
Likewise, the CJEU adopts an almost identical approach. In his opinion in 
Samba Diouf  case, the Advocate General underlines that  in so far as the 
EU on the one hand, explicitly provides for the right to an effective remedy 
in the context of procedures for granting or withdrawing refugee status and 
on the other hand, requires the Member States to discharge their competence 
to organize those procedures in particular, and, moreover, to do so under 
conditions which ensure that that right is fulfilled, then the procedural 
autonomy of the Member States does not create an obstacle to its 
effectiveness.52 Furthermore, in the Joined Cases N.S. and M.E. the Court of 
Justice, concluded that the margin of discretion enjoyed by the Member 
States as to the specific procedural form of the effective remedy within the 
49 See ECtHR, Vilvarajah and Others v. the UK, no 13163/87, 30 October 1991, par. 102, 
Series A no. 215, and Ahmed and Others v. Austria, no 22954/93, 17 December 1996, par. 
38, Reports 1996-VI. 
50 See ECtHR, Soering v. the UK, no 14038/88, 7 July 1989, par. 90-91; Vilvarajah and 
Others, cited above, par. 103; Ahmed, cited above, par. 39; H.L.R. v. France, no 24573/94, 
29 April 1997, par. 34, Reports 1997-III; Jabari v. Turkey, no. 40035/98, 11 July 200, par. 
38, ECHR 2000-VIII; Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, no. 1948/04, 11 January 2007, par. 
135; Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, no 27765/09, (GC) 23 February 2012, par. 114. 
51 ECtHR, M. and Others cited above, par. 128. 
52 CJEU, Brahim Samba Diouf, Opinion of Advocate General, cited above, par. 47. 
 28 
                                                 
meaning of Article 47 of the Charter is limited by the requirement that the 
effectiveness of the remedy must always be guaranteed.53  
The issue of how the Courts adjust the application of the procedural 
autonomy principle to immigration and refugee law cases is interesting 
because a double goal is simultaneously achieved. On the one hand they 
deal with the sovereignty “thorn” with the necessary discretion and at the 
same time they justify and robust their role as monitoring mechanisms οn 
human rights and protection issues. In that context, it is being suggested that 
although the general rule is that Member States have procedural autonomy, 
national procedural rules may not render practically impossible or 
excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law. 
Consequently, Contracting States are definitely afforded some discretion as 
to the manner in which they conform to their obligations under both the 
CEAS and ECHR provisions, but there are certain procedural guarantees 
that have to have in place so as for the rights of protection seekers to be 
ensured. For the sake of precision, the meaning of the word “certain” in the 
previous sentence is to be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
3.2 The content and scope of the right to 
an effective remedy 
3.2.1 The ‘effectiveness’ test 
In order to give the right to effective remedies flesh and bones, one needs to 
consider the various elements composing the notion of effectiveness. 
53 CJEU, Joined Cases N.S. (C-411/10) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and 
M.E. and Others (C-493/10) v Refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform, (GC) 21 December 2011, par. 160. 
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Starting from the M.S.S. case, the European Court held that Article 13 of the 
Convention guarantees the availability at national level of a remedy to 
enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever 
form they may happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. The effect 
of Article 13 is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy to deal 
with the substance of an “arguable complaint” under the Convention and to 
grant appropriate relief.54 What values here is that although the Court 
accepts that the scope of the Contracting States' obligations under Article 13 
varies depending on the nature of the applicant's complaint it sets the 
requirement of effectiveness –in practice as well as in law- as a common 
threshold. Interestingly enough, the Court for the first time in M.S.S. case 
specified the requirements corresponding to the demands of effectiveness 
under Article 13 of the Convention. Without focusing on the outcome of the 
remedy, the Strasbourg Court insisted in the procedure that states should 
have in place in order to enable the applicants to ask and be granted the 
form of protection they are entitled to. Allow me here to parallel the Court’s 
findings to a set of principles mainly used for assessing economic, social 
and cultural rights in a policy framework, namely the principles of 
availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality.55  
First of all the Court submitted that the remedies have to be available in the 
sense that their exercise must not be unjustifiably hindered by the acts or 
54 ECtHR M.S.S. cited above, par. 288; Auad v. Bulgaria, no. 46390/10, 11 October 2011, 
par. 122.   
55 See for example Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 
No. 14, The right to the highest attainable standard of health (Art. 12 of the ICESCR) 
(2000), par. 12.  
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omissions of the authorities of the respondent State56 (availability). Further, 
it underlined the respondent State’s obligation to facilitate the protection 
seekers’ access to a fair and effective international protection system and 
their communication with the competent authorities, their access to legal aid 
if and when necessary and the reception of the necessary information 
concerning the procedure57 (physical, economic, information accessibility). 
The Court also pointed out that the procedure has to be sensitive in 
vulnerabilities and culture, gender or age appropriate, i.e. respectful of the 
special characteristics of individuals, minorities, as well as designed to 
respect confidentiality and improve the human right status of those 
concerned58 (acceptability). And finally it maintained that the system in 
place should be able to guarantee a proper review of an international 
protection request and/or deportation order with suspensive effect satisfying 
the needs of legal certainty and protection required in such matters59 
(quality). The assessment of all the above elements led the Court in M.S.S. 
case to conclude that because of the shortcomings of the procedure in 
Greece60 the applicant remained without adequate protection. 
It is important to note here that M.S.S. presents an interesting element as 
rather decisive: the relationship between rights and procedures, which may 
56 ECtHR, M.S.S. cited above, par. 288-289. 
57 ECtHR, M.S.S. cited above, par. 304, 318-319. 
58 ECtHR, M.S.S. cited above, par. 263. 
59 ECtHR, M.S.S. cited above, par. 293. 
60 ECtHR, M.S.S. cited above, par. 301 “The Court notes, firstly, the shortcomings in 
access to the asylum procedure and in the examination of applications for asylum: 
insufficient information for asylum seekers about the procedures to be followed, difficult 
access to the Attica police headquarters, no reliable system of communication between the 
authorities and the asylum seekers, shortage of interpreters and lack of training of the staff 
responsible for conducting the individual interviews, lack of legal aid effectively depriving 
the asylum seekers of legal counsel, and excessively lengthy delays in receiving a decision. 
These shortcomings affect asylum seekers arriving in Greece for the first time as well as 
those sent back therein application of the Dublin Regulation.” 
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include civil and political rights as well as social rights. So, an unfair 
procedure can breach a social right too. Specifically in this case the Court 
found that systematic administrative deficiencies combined with the failure 
of Greek government to satisfy the minimum requirements as regards the 
asylum seekers reception conditions, amounts to inhuman and degrading 
treatment. In that context and given that administrative procedures make 
fundamental rights work, the Court recognized the double perspective of the 
right to an effective remedy as a fundamental right which is both procedural 
and substantial.61  
The spirit of that judgment appears to have influenced the CJEU in the 
Cimade and Gisti Case. The Court held that asylum seekers are allowed to 
remain not only in the territory of the Member State in which the application 
for asylum is being examined but also in that of the Member State in which 
that application was lodged, as required by Article 3(1) of Reception 
Conditions Directive and that State is obliged to grant the minimum 
conditions for reception of asylum seekers laid down in RCD to that asylum 
seeker even though under the Dublin Regulation the State decided to call 
upon another Member State, as the State responsible for examining his 
application for asylum, to take charge of or take back that applicant.62  
Following that reasoning the Court interpreted the provisions of the 
Directive in an expansive way ensuring full respect for human dignity and 
promoting the application of the Charter. Thus, it concluded that the 
relevant provisions apply not only with regard to asylum seekers present in 
61 See here Dr. Juli Ponce, 2005, Good Administration and Administrative Procedures, 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, V. 12 (2), p. 577. 
62 CJEU, Case C-179/11 Cimade, GISTI v Ministre de l’Intérieur, de l’Outre-mer, des 
Collectivités territoriales et de l’Immigration, 27 September 2012, par. 48-50. 
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the territory of the Member State responsible pending that State’s decision 
on their application for asylum but also to asylum seekers awaiting a 
decision on which Member State will be held responsible for their 
application. Such emphasis to the right to enter the territory and remain 
there under conditions that respect the applicant may definitely signal an 
inclusive approach of the right to receive protection. 
The same and even more advanced approach was maintained by the ECtHR 
in Hirsi case. The challenge for the Court in that case, was undoubtedly of 
greater scale given that the situation as such (people aboard military ships 
on high seas) might have possibly allowed for a rather reserved 
interpretation. Nevertheless, the Strasbourg Court followed the same line of 
reasoning, suggesting that the procedure is a factor that cannot be bypassed 
no matter what the particularities of every single case might be, using the 
right to an effective remedy as the platform from which a series of 
guarantees for protection seekers begin. In particular the Court emphasized 
on the right of the applicants to obtain sufficient information, enabling them 
to gain effective access to procedures and substantiate their complaints, a 
right essential for anyone subject to a removal measure, the consequences of 
which are potentially irreversible, according to the judgment’s wording.63 
Additionally, the Strasbourg Court dealt with the right to an effective 
remedy in relation to detention conditions and removal. In R.U. v. Greece 
and Ahmade v. Greece cases, the Court found a violation of Article 13 in 
conjunction with Article 3 on two grounds: the first related to the appalling 
detention conditions and the second to the removal itself. It specifically 
63 ECtHR, Hirsi, cited above, par. 202, 204. 
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submitted that the lack of remedies enabling the applicants to complain 
about their detention in combination with the deficiencies in Greek asylum 
system -already observed in M.S.S. judgment- form a direct infringement of 
Article 13. It also found a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 
3 in respect of the risk of the applicants’ removal, arguing that the applicants 
were still at risk of being sent back without having the opportunity of their 
asylum application being properly examined, despite there being substantial 
grounds for believing that they would be subjected to treatment contrary to 
Article 3 of the Convention if sent back there.64  
Pursuant to the reasoning in M.S.S., it seems that it’s the availability and 
quality criteria that are not met here, due mainly to the lack of a rigorous 
scrutiny of applicants’ complaints by a national authority. In that context, 
the Court once again emphasized on the absence of an effective procedure 
accessible for the applicants, given on the one hand that the Greek courts did 
not have power to examine the living conditions in detention centers for 
clandestine foreigners or to order the release of a detainee on the grounds of 
such conditions and on the other hand Greece’s asylum legislation was not 
being applied in practice and the asylum procedure was marked by such 
major structural deficiencies that asylum seekers had very little chance of 
having their applications and their complaints under the Convention 
seriously examined. 
Discussing about expulsion it is equally noteworthy the reference to the M. 
and Others v. Bulgaria case, where the ECtHR attached particular 
importance in the deficiency of proceedings for judicial review of an 
64 ECtHR, R.U. v. Greece, no 2237/08, 7 July 2011, par. 82-83; Ahmade v. Greece, no 
50520/09, 29 September 2012, par. 88, 112, 114. 
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expulsion order citing national security grounds. In this case the Court apart 
from the availability of a remedy criterion, it added the requirement of 
proper examination of necessity and proportionality issues to the 
effectiveness test. In particular it held that the failure of the national court to 
carry out a meaningful scrutiny of the executive’s assertion that the 
applicant presented a national security risk, and to assess whether the 
interference with the applicants’ rights met a pressing social need and was 
proportionate to any legitimate aim pursued undermined the effectiveness of 
this remedy with regard to the requirements of Article 13 in conjunction 
with Article 3.65 
Due regard should be paid here to the significance that the Strasbourg Court 
places on the issue of redress, speaking of fair and effective remedial 
mechanisms. In M.S.S. case, it reiterated that while the effectiveness of a 
remedy does not depend on the certainty of a favorable outcome for the 
applicant, the lack of any prospect of obtaining adequate redress raises an 
issue under Article 13.66 Likewise in Auad v. Bulgaria case, the refusal of 
the national court to deal with the question of risks when determining the 
lawfulness of the expulsion led the Court to conclude that Bulgaria did not 
point to any procedure whereby the applicant would be able to challenge the 
assessment of those claims while at the same time it did not appear possible 
for him to bring a separate legal challenge against the enforcement of the 
expulsion order. It in fact emphasized that there existed no avenue of redress 
65 ECtHR, M. and Others v. Bulgaria, no 41416/08, 26 July of 2011, par. 125-126. 
66 ECtHR M.S.S., cited above, par. 394. 
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that meets the two requirements of effectiveness, namely rigorous scrutiny 
and access to a remedy with automatic suspensive effect.67 
It light of the above it is demonstrated that a remedy cannot be considered 
effective when irreparable harm may be done before the final judgment has 
been reached. In asylum cases removal of the asylum seeker before the court 
has reached a final judgment against the removal order or negative asylum 
decision may lead to such irreparable harm: death, torture or inhuman 
treatment of the applicant. The remedy is also rendered ineffective by the 
real chance that asylum seekers who are expelled to their country of origin 
lose contact with their lawyers and disappear or face difficulties 
substantiating their case.  
By the same token, in establishing a justification of the relevance of the 
ECHR to expulsion cases, the Court resorts to a teleological interpretation. 
Referring to its earlier case law and taking into account the special character 
of the ECHR as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights, the 
Court reminds us that the Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are 
not theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective.68 This 
principle of effective protection, defined by Merills as ‘a means of giving 
the provisions of a treaty the fullest weight and effect consistent with the 
language used and with the rest of the text in such a way that every part of it 
can be given meaning’69 is masterly used as a way to insert the prohibition 
67 ECtHR, Auad v. Bulgaria, no 46390/10, 11 October of 2011, par. 120-123; See also 
Labsi v. Slovakia, no 33809/08, 15 May 2012, par. 138. 
68 See earlier e.g. ECtHR Marckx v Belgium, no. 6833/74, 13 June 1979, par. 31; Airey v 
Ireland, no. 6289/73, 9 October 1979, par. 24 and Artico v Italy, no. 6694/74, 13 May 1980, 
par. 33. 
69 Merills, J.G., 1993, The Development of International Law by the European Court of 
Human Rights, Manchester: MUP, p. 98. 
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of refoulement into Article 3 of the Convention, thereby introducing a 
counterweight against the legitimate interest of the State to remove someone 
from its territory. What remains to be examined is the degree to which the 
Court of Justice shares the same findings or/and whether it has more to add.  
3.2.2 The interaction between Strasbourg and 
Luxembourg 
Discussing about the meaning of the right to an effective remedy, a CJEU 
judgment that requires special attention, is that of Samba Diouf, not only 
because it was the one that followed the logic permeated the M.S.S. 
judgment but rather due to its advanced –until that time- method to interpret 
that right, bringing together all the various expressions of current law in the 
context of the EU and the Member States but also in the context of certain 
international instruments (synthetic interpretation with emphasis to 
procedure). The Court made a validity test of Article 39 of Asylum 
Procedures Directive on the right to an effective remedy and the kind of 
decisions contested and the general principle of the right to an effective 
remedy deriving from Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR in relation to 
(accelerated) national RSD procedures.  
According to Advocate General the right to an effective judicial protection 
as expressed in Article 47 of the CFREU, acquires a separate identity and 
substance under that article which are not the mere sum of the provisions of 
Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR. In other words, once recognized and 
guaranteed by the EU, that fundamental right goes on to acquire a content of 
its own, the definition of which is certainly shaped by the relevant 
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international instruments, including, first and foremost, the ECHR, but also 
by the constitutional traditions from which the right in question derives.70 
Thus the Advocate General distinguished between the content of the right to 
judicial protection and its scope (see above 2.2.) and held that the right is 
applicable to ‘decisions taken on an application for asylum’ given the fact 
that such decisions are made subject ‘to an effective remedy before a court 
or tribunal’, which, according to recital 27 in the preamble to APD, is 
simply the reflection of a basic principle of Community law, ultimately 
established as primary law by the Charter.71 Such an argument overpasses 
the limitation posed by Article 13 according to which the independent 
procedural remedy is required only in respect of the rights guaranteed by the 
ECHR to the benefit of the applicant. Following the same syllogism, the 
Court went on to explain the mandatory content of the right recognized 
by Article 47 of the Charter drawn from the ECHR as interpreted by the 
ECtHR,72 and found that Article 39 of APD is quite naturally consistent to 
those interpretations, in that it expressly guarantees the right to an effective 
remedy against administrative decisions rejecting an application on grounds 
of substance, form or procedure. The crucial contribution of this provision 
lies on the fact that it grants the right to an effective remedy against any 
asylum decision including for example manifestly unfounded cases. It can 
be thus argued that this right offers broader protection than the right to an 
effective remedy provided for by international human rights law, which is 
70 CJEU, Brahim Samba Diouf, Opinion of Advocate General, cited above, par. 39. 
71 Ibid, par. 42. 
72 See generally in this regard van Dijk/van Hoof/van Rijn/Zwaak (eds.), 2006, Theory and 
practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 4th ed., Intersciencia, Antwerp. 
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limited to persons with an arguable claim that their expulsion would lead to 
a violation of the prohibition of refoulement. 73 
Further, the CJEU, in line to M.S.S. reasoning, adopts the “overall 
examination of a system” criterion pursuant to Recital 27 to APD which 
states: ‘... The effectiveness of the remedy, also with regard to the 
examination of the relevant facts, depends on the administrative and judicial 
system of each Member State seen as a whole.’ The Advocate General 
emphasized that the decisive factor is that, in so far as it contains elements 
of a substantive decision, that decision should be amenable to a remedy 
before the refusal to grant asylum becomes final and definitive and, 
therefore, enforceable.74 It is therefore appropriate to determine whether the 
system put in place by the national rules at issue in the main proceedings 
observes the principle of effective judicial protection and, in particular, 
whether every applicant has effective access to procedures, the opportunity 
to cooperate and properly communicate with the competent authorities so as 
to present the relevant facts of his/her case and sufficient procedural 
guarantees to pursue his/her case throughout all stages of the procedure.75 It 
is obvious that what matters for the comprehensive assessment of a 
procedure is the actual protection, not the formalities. If for example a 
country’s system has all the elements of effective protection without the 
formality of a RSD, then the above requirements should be deemed 
satisfied. The argument expressed by the Court of Justice as well as by the 
ECtHR in M.S.S., Hirsi and I.M. cases is that the necessary guarantees 
73 Reneman, M., 2010, An EU Right to Interim Protection during Appeal Proceedings in 
Asylum Cases?, European Journal of Migration and Law 12, 433.  
74 CJEU, Brahim Samba Diouf, Opinion of Advocate General, cited above, par. 58. 
75 Ibid, par. 5; Recital 13 to 2005/85 Directive. 
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against arbitrary removal could be afforded by the aggregate of remedies 
under domestic law, which could accordingly satisfy the requirements of 
Article 13 even if no single remedy by itself did so.76  
This requirement seems to robust the paper’s main argument, that the right 
to an effective remedy is seen as a part of a whole mechanism, system or 
procedure which enables protection seekers to claim their rights towards a 
State and be granted the necessary protection. For example in I.M. case the 
Court observed with regard to the effectiveness of the domestic legal 
arrangements as a whole, that while the remedies of which the applicant had 
made use had been available in theory, their accessibility in practice had 
been limited by the automatic registration of his application under the fast-
track procedure, the short deadlines imposed and the practical and 
procedural difficulties in producing evidence (inadequate legal and 
linguistic assistance provided, brief interview despite the fact that the case 
was complex and concerned a first-time asylum claim). After all the Court 
concluded that, but for its intervention, the applicant would have been 
deported without his claims having been subjected to the closest possible 
scrutiny.77 
A similar synthetic approach was adopted by the CJEU in Joint Cases N.S. 
and M.E, where the Luxembourg Court examined the relationship between 
the rights of asylum seekers under Article 47 of the Charter and the risk of 
expulsion to a persecuting State, in the context of a transfer of asylum 
seekers under the Dublin II Regulation. According to Advocate General the 
distinction between an infringement of the Geneva Convention or the ECHR 
76 ECtHR, Hirsi cited above § 197, M.S.S. cited above § 289, I.M. cited above, § 127.  
77 ECtHR, I.M. cited above, par. 158. 
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in connection with the transfer of an asylum seeker to a Member State in 
which there is a serious risk of his expulsion to a persecuting State and any 
associated infringement of EU law, serves no more than only a limited and 
strict, de jure distinction, since as a rule, there is a de facto parallel between 
the infringement of the Geneva Convention or the ECHR and the 
infringement of EU law reflected in practice.78 In this connection, the Court 
based its reasoning to the M.S.S. judgment where the guarantees regarding 
the transfer of asylum seekers among Member States under the ECHR were 
thoroughly clarified. 
The crucial contribution of CJEU through this judgment is the fact that it 
dared a direct interference into the EU legislation issues questioning a whole 
mechanism, namely the transfers under Dublin II Regulation. Yet, with a 
paradigmatic maneuver managed to provide for a solution derived from the 
Regulation itself so as not to prove it generally problematic undermining its 
role within the CEAS. Specifically, the Court maintained that the 
conclusive presumption that a Member State will not expel the asylum 
seeker to another State in contravention of the ECHR or the Geneva 
Convention renders excessively difficult or even precludes de facto the 
judicial review of the risk of chain deportation to a persecuting State, 
contrary to the minimum content of the right to an effective remedy, the 
principle of effectiveness, and the Charter. For these reasons it found it 
necessary and appropriate to consider this presumption refutable.79 
78 CJEU, Joined Cases N. S. and M. E. cited above, Opinion of Advocate General 
TRSTENJAK par. 153. 
79 Ibid, par. 161, 163. 
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Likewise, in the more recent K. case the CJEU held that the competent 
national authorities are under an obligation to ensure that the 
implementation of Dublin II is carried out in a manner which guarantees 
effective access to the procedures for determining refugee status. As to 
whether and on what conditions the right to intervene provided for in Article 
3(2) of Dublin Regulation may crystallize into a duty to intervene, the 
Advocate’s General repeated the argument expressed in the N. S. and Others 
case,80 that a decision made by a Member State under Article 3(2) of Dublin 
Regulation whether to examine a claim for asylum is to be regarded, as a 
national implementing measure, so that in taking such a decision the 
Member States must comply with the requirements of the Charter. 
Following that line of reasoning she concluded that under Article 52(3) of 
the Charter, it must be ensured that the protection guaranteed by the Charter 
in the areas in which its provisions overlap with those of the ECHR is no 
less than the protection granted by the ECHR. And, as long as the extent and 
scope of the protection granted by the ECHR has been clarified in the case-
law of the ECtHR, particular significance and high importance are to be 
attached to that case-law in connection with the interpretation of the relevant 
provisions of the Charter by the CJEU.81 
In light of the aforementioned, the interaction among different judicial and 
instrumental mechanisms, namely courts as well as national, European and 
80 See the CJEU, (pending) Case C-4/11, Federal Republic of Germany v Kaveh Puid, 
where the following question is going to be discussed: Does an enforceable personal right 
on the part of the asylum-seeker to force a Member State to assume responsibility result 
from the duty of the Member States to exercise their right under the first sentence of Article 
3(2) of Regulation 343/2003? 
81 CJEU, C-245/11, K. v Bundesasylamt, Opinion of Advocate General TRSTENJAK, 
delivered on 27 June 2012, par. 84, 87. 
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international pieces of legislation, reflected in the judgments’ reasoning, 
should be seen as an innovation of great significance, reflecting the need for 
a coherent asylum system with emphasis to procedure. That kind of 
“synthetic interpretation focusing on procedure” reminds me of the Kantian 
theory of analytic-synthetic distinction.82 Such a distinction is primarily met 
in philosophy and distinguishes between analytic and synthetic propositions, 
the former being those which are true by virtue of their meaning and the 
latter those that are true by how their meaning relates to the world.83 If we 
are to accept that a legislative provision is something true by virtue of its 
meaning then a synthetic approach of many similar subject-matter 
provisions through practical experience (empiricism) is true by exactly how 
their meaning, relates to the world or even better to the field they aim to 
serve.  
To put it another way, this synthetic approach’s findings are validated by, 
and grounded in, experience. It is a logical contingency that both the 
Luxembourg and the Strasbourg Courts are taking into account all the 
relevant European and international legislation through the microscope of 
State’s practice in order to achieve the highest possible degree of effective 
protection for those in need. As already been suggested earlier, this process 
can be considered as indicative of a system of coherence where principles, 
safeguards and concepts, which do not necessarily collide, are brought 
together enabling judges collect, test, and improve their legal reasoning 
expressed through the rulings in question. 
82 Kant, Immanuel, (1781/1998), The Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge University Press 
83 Rey, Georges, (2003), The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Edward Zalta (ed.). 
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3.2.3 Contextual interpretation: The role of 
presumptions 
Further highlighting the aforementioned link of a legislative provision to the 
context it is being applied, I would like to focus on another method used 
lately by the Courts adjusted to contemporary demands, aiming at a 
workable international protection and remedial system, that of contextual 
interpretation. In the Migrationsverket case, the CJEU adopted the 
contextual analysis theory, stating that in interpreting a provision of EU law, 
it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which 
it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part. 
Specifically, analyzing the objectives of Dublin Regulation the Advocate 
General submitted that it focuses firstly on guaranteeing the right of asylum 
by means of a procedure which is rapid, based on objective criteria and fair 
for all those involved.84  
Within the same logic of contextual analysis regard has to be paid to the 
discussion on presumptions under Dublin Regulation. In M.S.S. case the 
Court maintained that the existence of domestic laws and accession to 
international treaties guaranteeing respect for fundamental rights in principle 
are not in themselves sufficient to ensure adequate protection against the 
risk of ill-treatment and that the diplomatic assurances given by Greece to 
Belgian authorities did not amount to a sufficient guarantee. This means that 
mere reference to the applicable legislation in the third state, be it Member 
State or third state, with no relevant information about the situation in 
84 CJEU, Case C-620/10, Migrationsverket v Nurije Kastrati and Others, Opinion of 
Advocate General TRSTENJAK delivered on 12 January 2012, par. 23-24; See also Case 
C-301/98 KVS International [2000] ECR I-3583, par. 21; Case C-300/05 ZVK [2006] ECR 
I-11169, par. 15; and Case C-19/08 Petrosian and Others [2009] ECR I-495, par. 34. 
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practice is not enough for absolving the sending State from its 
responsibility.85 The general context and generally the practice followed in 
the State in question has to be taken into account. The Luxembourg Court,  
as already stated, followed the same approach in Joint Cases N.S. and M.E. 
It concluded that the logic that national courts must proceed from the 
conclusive presumption that a Member State is a safe country in which 
asylum seekers are not exposed to the risk of expulsion to a persecuting 
State, is contrary to the Geneva Convention and the ECHR, as well as 
incompatible with Article 47 of the European Charter.86 Thus, the 
presumption underlying the relevant legislation that asylum seekers will be 
treated in a way which complies with fundamental rights, must be regarded 
as rebuttable and the Member States, may not transfer an asylum seeker to 
the ‘Member State responsible’ within the meaning of Dublin II where they 
cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in 
the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State amount to 
substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real 
risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment.87 
Equally, one could recognize identical line of reasoning in the recent M.A. 
and Others case which however, should be distinguished by the Joint Cases 
N.S. and M.E., since the Court didn’t have to assess the relatively certain 
risk of systematic breaching of fundamental rights as a result of the transfer 
of the person concerned, but, much more generally, a core question of 
interpretation of Article 6 of the Dublin Regulation, that is to say, the rule 
85 ECtHR, M.S.S. cited above, par. 353-354. 
86 CJEU, Joint Cases N.S. and M.E, Opinion of the Advocate General, cited above, par. 
164. 
87 CJEU, Joint Cases N.S. and M.E, cited above, par. 104, 106. 
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applicable to determining the Member State which must examine the 
asylum application lodged by a minor. The Court held that the Regulation is 
structured between, at the one extreme, a ‘sovereignty clause’ and, at the 
other, a ‘residual clause’ and between the two lies a range of possible 
solutions, chosen on the basis of several criteria for determining the 
Member State responsible. In this case the criterion of the best interest of 
the child was suggested by the Court as providing for the most effective 
solution given the circumstances of the case (context) and mainly the fact 
that the applicant was an unaccompanied minor.88 
Likewise, the H.I.D. case discussed about presumptions in the Asylum 
Procedures Directive and the possibility of prioritizing the processing of 
asylum applications by persons belonging to a certain category defined on 
the basis of nationality or country of origin. According to the Advocate 
General the Member States enjoy certain discretion in their procedural 
organization, provided that the national courts are able to ascertain the 
merits of the grounds on which the competent national authority considered 
that the application for international protection was unfounded or abusive, 
without those grounds having the benefit of an irrebuttable presumption of 
legality.89 Thus, the examination of the merits of a decision is set as a 
prerequisite. 
Furthermore, a contextual analysis is arguably used, although in an 
underlying manner in both Hirsi and M.S.S. cases, where the Strasbourg 
Court tried to adjust the procedural requirements of the protection 
88 CJEU, Case C-648/11 M.A. and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
Opinion of Advocate General CRUZ VILLALÓN delivered on 21 February 2013, par. 54, 
64. 
89 See CJEU, Samba Diouf, cited above, par. 61. 
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guaranteed to the specific circumstances of each case. On the one hand, in 
Hirsi case the Court was required to assess the particularities of the 
interception on the high seas and the objective difficulties of an on board 
asylum mechanism in order to come up with a workable formula on purpose 
of guaranteeing effective access to procedures while in M.S.S. case the 
Court had to deal with the systematic deficiencies of a national RSD system 
and their implications for the applicant at a specific time and place. 
Therefore the Court interpreted the relevant legislation in such a way to 
honor the pertaining objectives and simultaneously achieve the best 
protection possible on a case-by-case basis. 
The Court’s innovation with regards to Hirsi case was in fact the reliance on 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)90 
whereby a treaty must be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose. According to that the ECtHR held that a purposive interpretation of 
Article 4 Protocol 4 of the ECHR reveals how the primary goal of the non-
refoulement norm is to prevent states from removing aliens without 
examining their individual circumstances.91 In particular it submitted that 
the letter of the provision has no territorial limitation and it refers very 
broadly to aliens, and not to residents, nor even to migrants while the 
purpose of the provision is to guarantee the right to lodge a claim for asylum 
which will be individually evaluated, regardless of how the asylum seeker 
90 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331, entry into force: 27 January 1980. Article 31 par. 
1: ”A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.” 
91 ECtHR, Hirsi, cited above, par. 177 
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reached the country concerned, be it by land, sea or air, be it legally or 
illegally. Judge Pinto De Albuquerque conquered by arguing that the 
purpose of the provision would be easily frustrated if a State could place a 
warship on the high seas or at the limit of national territorial waters and 
proceed to apply a collective and blanket refusal of any refugee claim or 
even omit any assessment of refugee status. Following that line of 
reasoning, the Court found that the applicants had been carried back to 
Libya in the absence of identification and examination of protection claims, 
under the control of a crew not trained in conducting interviews, and 
without legal advisors or translators on board the intercepting military 
vessels. Taking these into account, the Court concluded that the forced 
removal of the applicants to Libya amounted to a collective expulsion in 
breach of Article 4 of Protocol 4. Further, it found the Italian Government in 
breach of Article 13 in combination with Article 3 of the Convention and 
Article 4 of Protocol 4 since the applicants were deprived of any remedy 
which would have enabled them to lodge their complaints with a competent 
authority and to obtain a thorough and rigorous assessment of their requests 
before the removal measure was enforced and even if such a remedy were 
accessible in practice, the requirements of Article 13 are clearly not met by 
criminal proceedings brought against military personnel on board the army’s 
ships, in so far as that does not satisfy the criterion of suspensive effect 
enshrined in the Court’s settled case law.92 Consequently, what is to be 
92 ECtHR, Hirsi, cited above, par. 205-206. See as well Čonka v Belgium, no. 51564/99, 
Judgment of 5 February 2002, §§ 79 et seq. 
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examined is whether national authorities afford applicants a realistic 
possibility of using a remedy.93 
The aforementioned lead us to the following two remarks: First, there seems 
to be a general tendency of both the Court of Justice as well as the European 
Court to rely the interpretation of relevant legislation on the specificities of 
each and every case and mainly on the context into which these rules are to 
be applied, with an ultimate aim to achieve in practice the grant of the 
protection required. Second, strengthening its previous stance in M.S.S. 
case, the ECtHR reiterated in Hirsi the importance of providing anyone 
subjected to a removal decision with adequate information to enable them 
both to gain access to asylum procedures and to substantiate their 
complaints under Article 3 of the Convention,94 a finding which confirms 
the admission that the principle of non-refoulement and the right to an 
effective remedy are closely linked.  
3.2.4 Burden of proof as a means of monitoring 
protection 
 
A rather technical issue directly connected with the functioning of the right 
to an effective remedy and the mentioned in previous paragraphs spirit of a 
comprehensive vision of the context, is the way that the Courts distribute the 
burden of proof. The ECtHR once again in M.S.S. case paved the way and 
rejected the Belgian Government’s argument that the applicant had not 
sufficiently individualized, before the Belgian authorities, the risk of having 
no access to the asylum procedure and being sent back by the Greek 
93 ECtHR, Hirsi, cited above, par. 207; Conka v Belgium. cited above par. 46. 
94 ECtHR, Hirsi, cited above, par. 204; M.S.S., cited above, par. 304. 
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authorities. The Court submitted that it was in fact up to the Belgian 
authorities, not merely to assume that the applicant would be treated in 
conformity with the Convention standards but, on the contrary, to first 
verify how the Greek authorities applied their legislation on asylum in 
practice. Had they done this, they would have seen that the risks the 
applicant faced were real and individual enough to fall within the scope of 
Article 3.95 
Following the same logic in M. and Others v. Bulgaria judgment, the 
Strasbourg Court held that while the national court apparently 
acknowledged the existence of persecution risks upon removal contrary to 
Article 3, it placed on the applicant the burden of proving that they 
stemmed from the Afghan authorities and that those authorities would not 
guarantee his safety, considering this approach deficient on two levels: First, 
it maintained that unjustifiably the national court placed excessive reliance 
on the question whether the ill-treatment risked in the receiving State would 
emanate from State or non-State sources, whereas, in accordance with the 
Court’s established case-law, this issue, albeit relevant, cannot be decisive. 
Second, it underlined that by dealing with such a serious issue summarily 
and by placing on the first applicant, without any explanation, the burden of 
proving negative facts, such as the lack of State guarantees in Afghanistan, 
the national court practically deprived the applicant of a meaningful 
examination of his claim under Article 3. In this connection the Court found 
a violation of Article 13, in view of the importance which it attaches to 
95 ECtHR M.S.S., cited above, par. 359. 
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Article 3 of the Convention and the lack of effectiveness of the remedy 
available.96 
The significance of analyzing the issue related to the burden of proof in 
those cases is mainly to understand of the logic behind, which is primarily 
related to the effective and fair character of the procedure. To put it briefly, 
the fact that the Courts place the burden of proving safety and protection for 
the individual in case of removal mainly to the states in question, can be 
considered as an extra means of monitoring national (intra-State) procedures 
in terms of fairness and effectiveness.  
3.2.5 The value of good administration 
Being at the sphere of technical issues and in an effort to gather all the 
elements analyzed above under one concept, it appears essential here to end 
the chapter on the content of the right to effective remedies by discussing 
the role of good administration in the examined case law. It is evident that 
the Courts are gradually placing specific value on this relatively new 
concept of good administration in asylum and immigration cases. The good 
administration arguments come to strengthen the requirement of a fair and 
effective procedure, taking into account that in most Members States the 
international protection procedure is under the competence of administrative 
authorities.  
Let’s see how this argument is applied in practice. In the indicative case of 
M.M. the Court of Justice focuses on the observance of the rights of the 
defense as a fundamental principle of EU law in accordance with Article 
96 ECtHR M. and Others, cited above, par. 127. 
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48(2) of the Charter on the rights of the defense as well as with Article 41 
the right to good administration which basically includes the right of every 
person to be heard, before any individual measure which would affect him 
or her adversely is taken, the right to have access to his or her file and the 
obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions.97 The 
Court affirmed the importance of the right to be heard and its very broad 
scope in the EU legal order, considering that that right must apply in all 
proceedings which are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting a 
person,98 an example of which is the international protection procedures. 
What follows is that the right of a protection seeker to be heard must apply 
fully to the procedure in which the competent national authority examines 
an application for international protection pursuant to rules adopted in the 
framework of the CEAS. 
This very issue of the rights of the defense has been earlier touched upon by 
the ECtHR in M.S.S. case when discussing the effectiveness of the 
applicant’s request for a stay of execution which according to Belgian law 
could be lodged before the competent authority “under the extremely urgent 
procedure”. The Court concluded that the procedure did not meet the 
requirements of the Court’s case-law since the extremely urgent procedure 
reduces the rights of the defense and the examination of the case to a 
minimum preventing the persons concerned from establishing the arguable 
97 See Case C-269/90 Technische Universität München [1991] ECR I-5469, par. 14, and 
Sopropé [2008] ECR I-10369, par. 50); the obligation to state reasons for a decision which 
are sufficiently specific and concrete to allow the person to understand why his application 
is being rejected is thus a corollary of the principle of respect for the rights of the defense. 
98 See, inter alia, Case C-287/02 Spain v Commission [2005]ECR I-5093, par. 37; Sopropé, 
par. 37; CaseC-141/08 P Foshan Shunde Yongjian Housewares & Hardware v Council 
[2009] ECR I-9147,par. 83; and Case C-27/09 P France v People’s Mojahedin Organization 
of Iran [2011]ECR I-0000, par. 64 and 65. 
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nature of their complaints.99 In light of these, the important remark to be 
done here is the Courts’ suggestion of the effectiveness of administrative 
procedures in asylum and migration cases and its link with the fundamental 
right to good administration under the European Charter. 
Having covered the main features of the right to an effective remedy,  what 
one should keep in mind is the elements determining its content and scope, 
stressed out by the Courts, namely: a) the notion of effectiveness using the 
availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality criteria extensively 
analyzed above, as indicators, b) the pragmatic approach of the different 
judicial and instrumental mechanisms in question, c) the role of contextual 
analysis and d) the value of good administration. The synthesis of those 
elements together with the special issue of interception that follows will 
finally provide us with a codification of the States’ obligations towards 
protection seeker from a procedural standpoint. 
3.3 Procedural guarantees in cases of 
interception on the high seas  
I deliberately chose to devote a separate chapter to the procedural 
guarantees applied in cases of interception considering their sui generis 
nature due to particularities related both to the special circumstances that 
occur as well as to the controversial issue of State responsibility. A major 
step forward in terms of border control measures and corresponding state 
responsibility beyond the territorial waters of an EU Member State, was 
made by the ECtHR with the judgement in Hirsi case. It would be thus 
99 ECtHR, M.S.S., cited above, par. 389-390. 
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interesting to examine the relevant procedural concerns raised in this paper 
along with that specific ruling, being it the first case in which the Court 
unanimously finds a European State in violation of human rights of migrants 
and refugees intercepted on the high seas and returned to a third country in 
the absence of any procedural safeguards. The application concerns the 
interception and immediate return to Libya of 11 Somali nationals and 13 
Eritrean nationals heading by boat for Italy from Libya. By endorsing the 
credo that ensuring access to protection to people at sea (therefore without 
any territorial limitation) is a legal and humanitarian imperative, this 
landmark judgment could serve as a guidance for other states within or 
outside the Council of Europe in order to re-modulate their interdiction 
operations along the lines and in consonance with the standards of refugee 
and human rights law.100 First of all, the Grand Chamber held that 
intercepted individuals were under the complete, effective, and exclusive 
control of Italian organs once put on board ships whose crews were 
composed of Italian military personnel and characterized the case as one “of 
extra-territorial exercise of jurisdiction by Italy capable of engaging that 
State’s responsibility under the Convention”.101 
Further, the Court in Hirsi reiterated the doctrine of ‘positive obligations’ 
adopted in the Osman v UK case according to which Article 2(1) of the 
ECHR embodies both the duty of states to refrain from the intentional and 
unlawful taking of life, but also the duty to take measures to protect the life 
of people under their jurisdiction if State authorities knew or ought to have 
100 Giuffre, Mariagiulia, Watered-down Rights on the High Seas: Hirsi Jamaa and Others v 
Italy, International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2012), p.  729. 
101 ECtHR, Hirsi, cited above, par. 81, 78. 
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known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of 
an identified individual or individuals.102 In light of that it affirmed, that 
Italy is not exempt from complying with its obligations under Article 3 of 
the Convention because the applicants failed to ask for asylum. Therefore, 
the absence of an explicit request for asylum does not necessarily absolve 
the authorities of their non-refoulement obligations under international 
human rights law.103 In this vein, a teleological interpretation of the Refugee 
Convention and international human rights treaties, including the ECHR, 
requires states to act proactively by informing refugees and by taking all 
necessary measures to ensure de facto compliance with the principle of non-
refoulement—the overarching goal of the asylum regime—thereby avoiding 
the delivery of refugees back to their persecutors as a consequence of states’ 
omissions.104 
In light of these, the ruling in Hirsi appears to uphold the principle that 
obstacles to the right to an effective remedy because of accelerated 
procedures of expulsion or denial of effective RSD measures are 
unjustifiable, and all migrants and refugees should be entitled to an in-
country right to judicial review with suspensive effect of the return order, 
and within reasonable time limits (see above Sections 3.2.1. and 3.2.3.). 
Considering the irreversible nature of the damage if the risk of torture or 
102 ECtHR, Osman v UK, 23452/94,  (GC) 28 October 1998, par. 116. 
103 Report to the Italian Government on the Visit to Italy carried out by the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CPT) from 27 to 31 July 2009. Council of Europe CPT/Inf (2010) 15, par. 32. 
104 See UNHCR, 2011, ‘Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee 
Status’ HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 3, par. 192; GS Goodwin-Gill, 2011, ‘The Right to Seek 
Asylum: Interception at Sea and the Principle of Non refoulement’, 23 International Journal 
of Refugee Law, p. 449. 
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inhumane treatments materializes in the receiving country105 and the 
ECtHR’s insistence on a positive obligation to ensure access to status 
determination procedures in order to evaluate the consequences of the 
expulsion of an individual to the country of origin, it can be argued, that 
although the ECHR does not contain a general obligation to provide a 
substantive assessment of asylum applications, a rigorous scrutiny must 
necessarily be conducted of an individual’s claim that his or her deportation 
will expose that individual to treatment prohibited by Article 3.106 And this 
could be sufficient justification that points to procedures performed in a 
place where such a scrutiny can be fully and effectively guaranteed, and this 
is not the sea, whatsoever. First of all, it is unrealistic that lawyers and 
translators for all the different nationalities may be placed at the disposal of 
migrants and refugees on the high seas, thus rendering nugatory any attempt 
of asylum seekers to claim protection or to receive information. But even if 
it were the case, with regard to the possibility to apply for asylum either on 
the vessels or on the mainland, it is submitted that the Hirsi decision would 
greatly lose its significance if boats were considered as an appropriate 
environment for processing asylum claims. Rather, ships should be 
unreservedly dismissed as suitable places for examining the individual 
situations of putative refugees, since they cannot be fairly interviewed in the 
intimidating atmosphere of a warship after an exhausting journey.107 
105 ECtHR, Gebremedhin v France (2007) par. 66; Abdolkhani and Karimnia v Turkey 
(2009) par. 58. 
106ECtHR, Hussun and Others v Italy  (2010).  
107J Schneider, ‘Comment to Hirsi (part II): Another Side to the Judgment’ (Strasbourg 
Observers, 5 March 2012) <http://strasbourgobservers.com/2012/03/02/hirsi-part-ii-
another-side-to-the-judgment/> accessed 31 March 2012.  
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Taking the Hirsi findings in conjunction with the analysis of the key issues 
composing the notion of effective protection into account, it would be safe 
enough to argue that the Courts and in particular Strasbourg follows a stable 
reasoning as regard the procedural requirements in all possible stages i.e. 
asylum, detention, removal, interception, trying to be in line with the EU 
states autonomy, keeping balance between EU policies and the principle of 
non-refoulement. In that context, the synthesis of findings that follows, 
despite the specific problems that unavoidably arise, has a clearer task to 
accomplish.  
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4 Synthesis of findings 
The above analysis of the European Courts’ recent case law appears to 
justify the main claim of this paper, namely the fact that the right to 
effective remedies – given the absence of an enforceable right to seek 
asylum - provide a solid basis for protection seekers to challenge their 
refoulement to unsafe territory and further claim access to a fair RSD 
procedure in line with both the European Law as well as International 
Refugee Law. In other words the right to an effective remedy tends to 
become the guarantor of protection seekers rights mainly by providing the 
platform which the procedural guarantees for a fair and effective protection 
system stem from. Despite the fact that the ECHR does not include refugee 
rights, the European Court alongside with the Court of Justice through their 
jurisprudence reveal a new dynamic of a synthetic interpretation of 
European and international legal instruments (i.e. the CFR and ECHR) with 
a considerable impact on the institution of asylum as a whole.  
Having said this, the promising point of the research in the Courts’ rulings 
appears to be the interaction between international law and EU acquis and 
its effect on migrants’ and refugees’ fundamental rights issues. The main 
concern in every case where a return to a third country is being 
contemplated is what treatment the particular person will receive in the 
relevant third country if he or she is to be removed now. Many of the third 
countries to which protection seekers are returned are assumed to be safe 
because they are not likely to persecute the particular applicants and do not 
consciously refoule people to their persecutors. As earlier suggested though, 
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refoulement can also result when an inadequate RSD procedure prevents an 
actual refugee from establishing his or her status to the satisfaction of the 
refouling state. This is the case for example with most of the south and 
eastern European states that lack of sufficiently developed asylum 
procedures or because of carrying a disproportionate obligation burden due 
to their geographical front-line position cannot effectively correspond to 
their duties, a situation in which certain fundamental rights and basic human 
needs are systematically denied. Consequently, a revisiting of the right to 
effective remedies and procedural guarantees, as suggested by the European 
Courts, requires a thorough examination of which human rights must be 
taken into account by a State when taking removal decisions, what is the 
content and scope of effective protection, how the right to an effective 
remedy can constitute a means to achieve such protection and what 
procedural safeguards the destination countries should provide in order for 
the relevant substantive criteria to be met. Each of these parameters is being 
discussed in detail and in light of the above analysis in the following 
paragraphs. 
4.1 Procedural Equations 
As argued earlier in section 2.1., the elements of effective protection is 
freedom from persecution in the third country (Art. 33 of 1951 Convention) 
and access to remedial mechanisms within a protection status determination 
procedures. 108 Ensuring that a fair and effective procedure actually occurs 
108 UNHCR Ex.Com. Conclusion 58 (XL), Problem of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers Who 
Move in an Irregular Manner from a Country in Which They Had Already Found 
Protection (1989) par. g; UNHCR Subcommittee of the Whole on International Protection 
 59 
                                                 
requires several safeguards. First the destination country should inform the 
applicant of its right to apply for a protection status as well as of where and 
how to apply. Although the 1951 Convention nowhere expressly requires a 
refugee status determination procedure, it is submitted that without a fair 
determination, the risk is that the person could be erroneously refouled.109 
Alice Edwards suggests that, read together Art. 1 and 33 of the Refugee 
Convention place a duty on State Parties to grant at a minimum, access to 
asylum procedures for the purpose of RSD.110 In that context and according 
to the latest jurisprudential trends examined in Chapter 3 we are pointed to 
the following pragmatic syllogism: Denial of access to a safe territory 
means denial of a fair RSD procedure which equates to denial of the right to 
seek protection, since the identification of those seekers who face risk of 
persecution becomes impossible. Considering further that a fair and 
effective determination procedure includes the right to appeal with 
suspensive effect a negative decision before a national competent authority, 
denial of the right to effective judicial protection means denial of fair 
determination procedures, namely denial of the right to seek effective 
protection in the first place, namely exposure to the risk of persecution.111 
of the Executive Committee, Background Note on the Safe Country Concept and Refugee 
Status, submitted by High Commissioner, 42nd Sess., EC/SCP/68 (26 July 1991), par. 13 
109 Legomsky, cited above, 654. 
110 Alice Edwards, 2005, Human Rights, Refugees, and the Right To Enjoy Asylum, 17 
Int’l J. Refugee L. 302. 
111 This argument can be put schematically as follows: a) Interceptions on the high seas: No 
access to safe territory = No access to a fair RSD (info – legal assistance – personal 
interviews – interpreter) = No access to effective remedies = Denial of the right to seek 
protection = Exposure to risk of refoulement, b) Dublin Returns: Access to a safe European 
territory → Transfer to the third country responsible with a deficient asylum system → 
Denial of a fair RSD = No access to effective remedies = Denial of the right to seek 
protection = Exposure to risk of refoulement or chain refoulement.  
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As all logical syllogisms, the malfunction of one component inevitably 
affects all the others and eventually the syllogism as a whole. Consequently 
there is a clear connection between the prohibition of refoulement and the 
right to seek protection, the right to seek protection and the granting of 
access to a fair determination procedure and between a fair determination 
procedure and the right to effective remedial mechanisms. That is why the 
Courts’ interpretation even in the most controversial cases of transferring 
protection seekers internally or externally, seriously takes into account 
procedural guarantees in support of non-refoulement principle. What the 
Courts primarily emphasize on is the principle of effectiveness, which raises 
the question whether a procedural rule of national or regional (CEAS) 
legislation renders EU law and ECHR’s application impossible or 
excessively difficult, to the detriment of the protection seekers’ rights and 
the asylum institution viewed as a whole.112 
4.2 Towards common EU procedural 
standards  
The majority of cases discussed throughout the present thesis suggest that 
the existence of procedural safeguards is central to the realization of the 
right to seek protection, given that individual assessment allows for the 
personal circumstances of the protection seeker to be taken into account as a 
country safe for some may be unsafe for others.113 That is why the right to 
challenge a decision of transfer or removal has been emphasized by the 
112 See for example C-276/01, Steffensen [2003] ECR I-3735, par. 66. 
113 See European Commission’s Amended  Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on common procedures for granting and withdrawing 
international protection status (Recast) COM (2011) 319, art 12. 
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Courts in the context of confronting safety presumptions, specifically under 
Dublin Regulation. While much of Dublin II is simply a question of burden 
allocation and not in violation of international refugee law, there is one 
aspect where the State in which the application for refugee status is 
currently lodged may be seen not to be fulfilling its 1951 Convention 
obligations in good faith. That is when returning the applicant to another 
Member State to have her/his application assessed placing him in a worse 
situation which might end up to persecution. This is well explained under 
Legomsky’s “complicity principle” argument: no country may send any 
person to another country, knowing that the latter will violate rights which 
the sending country is itself obligated to respect, regardless whether the 
third country is a party to the 1951 Convention or to any other human rights 
conventions.114 What the aforementioned case law suggests is leaning to 
what Noll calls the “empirical  approach” which contrary to the “formal 
approach” permitting return as long as the third country is a party to 1951 
Convention and thus formally bound to respect its dictates, entails inquiry 
into not only the relevant legislation in place but also the actual conditions 
and practices of the third country, mainly as suggested by the Court resting 
on the interpretation of IL by lawfully established official international 
entities i.e. UNHCR.115 
Furthermore the Courts’ interpretation demonstrates a tendency to link the 
right to an effective remedy in asylum cases with an autonomous and 
justiciable principle of good administration. The Court of Justice, when 
114 Legomsky, cited above, 620. 
115 Noll, G., 2001, Formalism v. Empiricism: Some Reflections on the Dublin Convention 
on the Occasion of Recent European Case Law, Nordic Journal of International Law, (70) 
p. 161-182. 
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interpreting Articles 41 and 47 of the Charter, will probably have recourse 
to the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court concerning administrative 
justice. According to Lord Millet ‘the right to good administration provides 
an umbrella for a non-exhaustive list of procedural guarantees’.116 Indeed, 
it has to be observed that the right to good administration, as expressed by 
the Charter and interpreted, mirrors the principles of fair trial (or due 
process) guaranteed by the ECHR. It is submitted that this right, together 
with the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, create a more general 
right to administrative justice. 117 This approach seems to be adopted by the 
Courts when guaranteeing efficient mechanisms for protection seekers to 
enforce ‘just’ treatment.  
However desirable it may seem, a satisfactory level of harmonized practice, 
particularly as concerns determination of international protection status may 
never be reached. Nevertheless increased uniformity of asylum practice 
seems to remain the goal that is why all latest attempts of implementing and 
interpreting the states’ obligations vis-à-vis protection seekers do not lose 
sight of procedure, as the counterbalance to administrative discretion and 
unpredictability. 
4.3 External border control standards 
Case law has significantly evolved as regards the topic of extra-territorial 
applicability of the ECHR, from which it can be derived that at least in 
exceptional circumstances, the liability of Contracting States can be incurred 
116 Lord Millett, 2002,The Right to Good Administration in European Law, ISSN 0033-
3565, no 2, 318. 
117 Cfr. A. W. Bradley, 1995, Administrative Justice: A Developing Human Right?, 1 
European Public Law 347, at 351. 
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for acts which take place or produce effects outside their territorial 
boundaries.118 This was considered necessary in view of the fact that 
destination countries have been steadily erecting procedural barriers to their 
asylum determination systems, including interception of vessels on the high 
seas, filing deadlines, safe country of origin restrictions, detention, penalties 
for unfounded claims.119 Nevertheless, what can be considered as a rather 
novel concept in the recent case law is the development of positive 
obligations doctrine under the Convention. While it has been argued by 
some scholars120 that the prohibition of refoulement is a matter of positive 
obligations, others have identified the prohibition of refoulement as 
primarily a negative obligation – an obligation to abstain from expulsion.121 
The ECtHR itself has to a certain degree refrained from linking the concept 
118 See e.g. ECtHR 23 March 1995, Loizidou v Turkey, Appl. No. 15318/89 (preliminary 
objections), § 59–64; ECtHR 12 December 2001, Bankovic a.o. v Belgium, Appl. No. 
52207/99, § 67–73; ECtHR 16 November 2004, Issa a.o v Turkey, Appl. No. 31821/96, § 
65–71. For an overview of case law on extra-territorial applicability of the Convention, see 
e.g. M. Gondek, ‘Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human 
Rights: Territorial Focus in the Age of Globalization?’, Netherlands International Law 
Review, Vol. 3, 2005, pp. 349–387; R.A. Lawson, ‘Life After Bankovic – On the 
Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights’, in F. Coomans 
and M. Kamminga (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, Antwerp: 
Intersentia 2004, pp. 83–123; O. de Schutter, ‘Globalization and Jurisdiction: Lessons from 
the European Convention on Human Rights’, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice 
Working Paper No. 9, NYU School of Law, 2005; R. Wilde, ‘Legal “Black Hole”?: 
Extraterritorial state action and international treaty law on civil and political rights’, 
Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2005), pp. 739–806. 
119 See e.g. UNHCR, Asylum Processes (Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures), Global 
Consultations on International Protection, 2nd Meeting EC/GC/01/12 (31 May 2001) 
120  See Noll, G., 2000, Negotiating Asylum. The EU Acquis, Extraterritorial Protection and 
the Common Market of Deflection, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p. 453–474. 
121 See e.g. De Schutter: ‘The distinction between positive and negative obligations should 
be seen not in abstract terms or as dependant upon the description we give of any 
particular situation, but as relative to the situation existing prior to the adoption of the 
measure which is challenged. If a foreigner is expelled, this brings about a change in his 
situation; if a foreigner is denied a visa to have access to the territory, this only denies him 
an advantage he was requesting; for these reasons, most would see the violation of a 
negative obligation in the first case, and a violation of a positive obligation in the second 
case.’ in: O. de Schutter, expert report in case Rechtbank Den Haag [District Court The 
Hague] 31 March 2005, CG Raad c.s. t. Staat der Nederlanden en Transvision BV, 
LJNAT2882, 04/1015 KG. 
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of positive obligations explicitly to refoulement-cases.122 However, from the 
M.S.S. case till Hirsi the European Court maintained a firm approach 
arguing that states’ obligations to provide acceptable detention and 
reception conditions are primarily considered as obligations of result, in 
which limited economic resources cannot justify the provision of conditions 
below the requirements of Article 3. In that context the Court seems to 
accept the solution suggested by Shue that non-refoulement cases are hybrid 
cases which impose both positive and negative obligations on an expelling 
State.123 They impose first, a positive obligation, to make a meaningful 
assessment of the risk and severity of ill-treatment the claimant fears. 
Secondly, once established that there is substantial risk that a human right 
will be breached (based either on the State’s own assessment or the 
existence of facts and circumstances which ought to have been known to the 
expelling State), the expelling State has the negative obligation not to 
refoule – since removal would then have as direct consequence the exposure 
of the individual to prohibited ill-treatment. In Hirsi case, as earlier 
discussed, the Court further distinguished between types of duties involved 
in honoring the prohibition of refoulement by referring to a positive duty to 
allow the person concerned to access a fair and effective refugee status 
determination procedure and enjoy all the necessary guarantees.124 
122 To be more precise, the Court refers to positive obligations in refoulement-cases only 
when the threat emanates from non-state actors in a third country. E.g. ECtHR, H.L.R. v 
France, no. 24573/94, 22 April 1997, par. 30; D. v UK, no. 30240/96, 2 May 1997, par. 49. 
123 Shue, H., 1996, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 
Princeton University Press, 2nd ed., 155.  
124 Maarten den Heijer, 2008, Whose Rights and Which Rights? The Continuing Story of 
Non Refoulement under the European Convention on Human Rights, European Journal of 
Migration and Law 10, 291.  
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Consequently, although the nature of human rights protection within the EU 
is essentially ‘negative’ in the sense that the EU is considered to be under a 
duty not to violate human rights whenever it takes action, but without any 
general competence to take positive action on human rights,125 the Courts’ 
interpretation demands the provision of identification procedures and 
remedial mechanisms in the event of a breach, an aspect of human rights 
duties that goes beyond the EU’s own understanding of its human rights 
duties. In short what is argued is that, in those areas where the EU have 
competence, not only are their institutions and agencies under an obligation 
to refrain from actively violating human rights, but that they are also under 
the obligation to protect and fulfill human rights in those areas.126 
4.4 Complications 
The hypothesis running through the present paper seems to be satisfied, 
namely the right to an effective remedy appears to be given such a special 
regard by the European Courts as to acquire an autonomous substance in 
refugee cases guaranteeing a certain mechanism where a series of 
procedural safeguards exist. Nevertheless, as to all syllogisms there is a 
strong antilogus. First of all, the question of whether the European Court 
and the Court of justice are the appropriate bodies to effectively specify the 
standards of a fair and effective procedure requires special attention. 
Further, many questions especially in determining what makes a procedure 
fair are still not sufficiently answered. However, what is being implied in 
125 Opinion 2/94 Accession by the Community to the European Convention on Human 
Rights [1996] ECR I–1759, par. 27. 
126 Tawhida Ahmed and Israel de Jesús Butler, 2006, The European Union and Human 
Rights: An International Law Perspective, The European Journal of International Law Vol. 
17(4), 800. 
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the present thesis is that Courts simply pave the way that States should 
follow in the law-making process. The CEAS recast for instance, can be 
seen as a process influenced by the pertaining jurisprudence. Concerns as 
regards the harmonization objective are also raised in the sense that 
harmonization might many times reflect the lowering of the protection 
standards and inevitably lead to equalizing down at the expense of 
protection seekers. On the other hand some of the proposed EU standards 
might even seem to exceed the requirements of international refugee law or 
some interpretations by the ECtHR might appear overstretching the 
potential of a complaint under Article 13.127 One could also argue that the 
explicit reference to certain procedural safeguards by the Courts and other 
monitoring bodies might result in rigidity.128 Having regard to all these 
reasonable concerns, the obvious argument in favor is legal certainty and 
reassertion of basic values.129 According to the spirit of the present thesis, a 
certain legal degree of procedural uniformity, necessary to get equality of 
rights among Member States and promote transparency of administrative 
actions, is at any case the goal. 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
In a world of nation-states, in which law follows rather than dictates 
practice130 asylum and immigration policies are captured between realist 
127 See ECtHR, M.S.S., cited above, Concurring Opinion of Judge Villiger. 
128 Sabino Cassese, 1993, Legislative Regulation of Adjudicative Procedures: An 
Introduction, 5 Eur. Rev. Pub. L., 16. 
129 Harlow, C., 1995, Codification of EC Administrative Procedures? Fitting the Foot to the 
Shoe or the Shoe to the Foot’, Jean Monnet Chair Papers (Badia Fiesolana), 30. 
130 See Ferguson, 1976, Refugees: A New Dimension in International Human Rights, 70 
AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 58, 74 ("The refugee problem entails facing the ultimate 
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fears and liberal values most of the times the dominance of realism over 
liberalism being the case. This credits the conclusion that the role of the 
judiciary in the asylum field is not only linked to the issue of independence 
but also to its capacity as the guarantor of principles and values that the rule 
of law oblige states to uphold, by setting precedent which highlights the 
establishment of specific procedural standards as a means of guaranteeing 
substantive rights under European and international law. To achieve that, the 
Courts appear to emphasize to a certain degree of coherence by weighing up 
partly incompatible demands and balancing them against each other. In that 
context and although it is difficult to speak of a liberal European approach 
to the protection of refugees in international law, the Courts seem to put a 
great effort to establish common criteria for assessing the principle of 
effective judicial protection and avoid deviations or misconceptions among 
states. 
It is highlighted through the above analysis that the Courts build upon the 
extant normative framework surrounding the refugee regime so as to reach a 
sufficient revitalization level. Their main contribution is placing the states 
right in front of a vital challenge which is not necessarily to produce new 
legal instruments, but rather to take advantage of the flexibility that the 
existing body of law affords to retool the relevant protection policies at an 
operational level.  
What this paper mainly proposes is the adoption by the Member States of 
this pragmatic and synthetic approach suggested by the Courts’ case law 
aiming to achieve full and inclusive compliance with international standards 
question of the nature of the nation-state, and whether the nation-state is consistent with the 
types of solutions that must be found for the resolution of the problem."). 
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through a coherent asylum system, whilst acknowledging the Member 
States’ concerns and difficulties. 131 This approach comes to heal the lack of 
provisions designed to preserve protection seekers rights and respectfully 
question those asylum and immigration policies shaped by security 
objectives resulting to the detriment of the primary obligation of states of 
guaranteeing the necessary protection to people in need.  
In light of these, and given that asylum practice in Europe sets an important 
example which goes well beyond the European space, policy-making 
institutions within the national sphere and the EU are urged to provide the 
forum to a general discussion and undertake the necessary action so as for 
the states to adjust their law and practice to the requirements of human 
rights and the demands of the contextual environment these rights are to be 
applied in.132  
The need for a more coherent system of law and principles applicable in 
refugee protection calls for a reasonable consensus reflected in the following 
approach: when principles collide, e.g., when the rights of protection seekers 
as individual rights collide with the norm of state sovereignty and the 
demand to ensure stability and security, the relevant question for decision 
makers, is not: "what principle is to be eliminated from the system?," but 
"how to optimalize both principles within the system?"133 This is a question 
of creating coherence and for the purposes of the present study, a query for 
131 Sylvie Da Lomba, 2004, The right to seek Refugee Status in the European Union, 
Intersentia, p. 16. 
132 Moreno-Lax, V., 2012 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy or the Strasbourg Court versus 
Extraterritorial Migration Control? Human Rights Law Review 12:3, p. 598. 
133 Alexy, R. and Peczenik, A., 1990, The Concept of Coherence and Its Significance for 
Discursive Rationality Ratio Juris. Vol. 3 No. 1, p. 137. 
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procedural safeguards guaranteeing legal justification and practical 
rationality. 
Without doubt, the European Union will continue playing an important role 
in the area of human rights, both in its external and internal policies.134 
Simultaneously, both the European Court as well as the Court of Justice 
look to decisions and jurisprudence of the other for guidance and while 
neither will consider itself bound by the other Court's decision, there is 
clearly deference and one can expect closer cooperation between the two 
Courts as the jurisdiction of the Luxembourg Court expands.135 Jean 
Monnet, one of the EU’s founding fathers once said “People only accept 
change when they are faced with necessity and only recognize necessity 
when a crisis is upon them”.  This paper argued that in view of the recent 
case law, European Courts seem to be fully aware of the permanent refugee 
crisis and its significant ramifications. They gradually and steadily 
recognize the necessity of change starting by offering clear-cut guidance 
related to the content and meaning of effective procedural safeguards in 
international protection issues. In that context and although concurring with 
Hathaway in that current refugee law imposes only a limited duty on 
states,136 far short of meeting the needs of refugees in a comprehensive way, 
the research into the recent European case law indicates the adherence to 
some irreducible humanitarian principles that require states to adopt a 
134 Peter Leuprecht, 1998, Innovations in the European System of Human Rights 
Protection: Is Enlargement Compatible With Reinforcement? 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 313. 
135 Elizabeth F. Defeis, 2001, Human Rights and the European Union: Who Decides? 
Possible Conflicts Between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of 
Human Rights, 19 Dick. J. Int'l L., 301. 
136 Hathaway, J., 1990, cited above, p. 132. 
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meaningful and needs-based approach to asylum and international 
protection emphasizing on the minimum (procedure) in order to reach the 
core (substance). It’s this obligation that the Courts remained consistent in: 
to alarm states by recognizing the significance of being open to pragmatic 
reforms especially at times of crisis. This statement points us to Nemat 
Shafic’s words in connection to the Eurozone crisis which by analogy could 
be extended to the issues at hand: “Managing the refugee regime crisis in 
Europe requires “more Europe”.137 And more Europe from this paper’s 
perspective includes not only states but all the institutional mechanisms 
established to uphold the core human rights norms and values in the area of 
granting protection to those in need. 
137 Dr. Nemat Shafik, Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, Productivity is Europe’s 
ultimate problem, Financial Times, 11 February 2013. 
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